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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a model of indirect lobbying where special interest
groups try to influence policy outcomes by targeting voters. Specifically,
competing lobbies engage in influence activities to affect the informa-
tion that a (possibly biased) media outlet collects on the public value
of approving/rejecting a policy proposal. The media outlet acts as a
ﬁlter between lobbies and voters. It has to decide what to communicate
to voters based on the information it collects and its own idiosyncratic
bias. The results show that the higher the idiosyncratic bias of the
media outlet, the lower the lobbies’ incentives to spend resources on
influence activities. Conversely, the lower the cost of engaging in influ-
ence activities for lobbies, the higher the probability of news-slanting
by the media outlet. Moreover, the more voters care about receiving
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accurate information, the higher the expected distortion in the policy
outcome. From a public policy perspective, increasing the cost of lob-
bies’ influence activities would decrease the distortion in the policy
outcome and increase voters’ welfare. Finally, asymmetries between lob-
bies lead to different probabilities of news-slanting by different media
outlet types.
Understanding the effects of lobbies’ influence activities on political out-
comes has been one of the main concerns of the political economy liter-
ature for a long time. In a seminal paper, Becker (1985) introduced the
concept of ‘‘influence function’’, suggesting that by exerting some kind of
political pressure interest groups are able to affect the tax or subsidy that
they pay/receive. In the 20 years that have followed, many scholars have
analyzed this issue by focusing on the relationships between lobbies and
politicians. This extensive literature has shown that special interest groups
may directly influence the policy outcome by targeting politicians.1 Indeed,
lobbies allocate large amount of resources in trying to influence politicians.2
Nevertheless, such a direct channel of policy influence is not always fea-
sible or effective for lobbies. First of all, in the case of direct democracy
(i.e., referenda, ballots, propositions, etc.), politicians are simply not the
policy-makers. Moreover, there are issues where the political cost that any
politician would incur by endorsing a lobby and deviating from the median
voter’s preferred policy outcome would be extremely high. Examples of such
‘‘non-pliable’’ issues are abortion, the death penalty, gun control and same-
sex marriage.3 Hence, whenever lobbies cannot directly affect the policy
outcome by influencing politicians, they have to try to do so indirectly by
targeting voters. A clear example of special interest groups whose activities
are explicitly focused on voters is represented by the 527 groups in the US.4
1 See, among others, Austen-Smith (1993), Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996,
2001), Lohmann (1998), Prat (2002a, 2002b), Coate (2003), Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006).
2 For example, in the 2004 US presidential elections, George W. Bush and John Kerry received
around 274 and 227 million dollars, respectively, from individuals and Political Action Com-
mittees’ contributions (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011a).
3 Indeed, Matsusaka (2010) ﬁnds that the congruence (i.e., the correlation) between policy and
public opinion in US states is 88% for same-sex marriage and higher than 70% for public
funding of abortion and death penalty.
4 A 527 group is “a tax-exempt group organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code
to raise money for political activities including voter mobilization eﬀorts, issue advocacy and
the like.” (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011b).
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This paper provides a stylized model of indirect lobbying to study the
influence of interest groups on voters. At the same time, given that the
media represent the main communication channel between interest groups
and voters, the paper analyzes the relationship between lobbies’ influence
activities and media bias. More importantly, I study the implications of
lobbies’ influence activities and media bias on the efficiency of the policy
outcome and on voters’ welfare.
The model is characterized by a multistage game where legislators have to
decide whether to approve a policy proposal or keep the status quo. Legis-
lators are assumed to be responsive to public opinion and thus they always
choose the policy outcome preferred by the majority of voters (i.e., the one
preferred by the median voter). Voters’ preferences are a combination of a
private value component (i.e., their idiosyncratic preferences) and a state-
dependent public value component (i.e., the expected net benefits of keeping
the status quo or approving the policy proposal). In the first stage of the
game, two opposing lobbies compete to influence the information that a
media outlet collects on the public value of approving the policy proposal.
The media outlet represents a ﬁlter between lobbies and the voters: it has to
decide what to communicate to voters based on the information it collects
and its own idiosyncratic bias. That is, the media outlet’s report is the result
of three different components: the true public value of approving the policy
proposal, lobbies’ influence activities and the media outlet’s idiosyncratic
bias. After having observed the report of the media outlet, voters update
their beliefs on the state of the world and then decide whether they prefer
the policy proposal to be approved or rejected.
By providing a micro-foundation for this influence mechanism, the model
offers several insights on the effects of lobbies’ influence activities and media
bias on policy outcomes. First, the results show that even though voters and
the media outlet are rational and take into account the presence of lobbies’
influence activities, a distortion is still present in the policy outcome. Second,
the lobbies’ incentives to exert effort and the media outlet incentives to
slant its reports show an asymmetric relationship. The higher the possible
bias of the media outlet the lower lobbies’ efforts are. This happens because
lobbies’ efforts are less productive when it is more likely that the media
outlet will slant its reports. In fact, a very biased media outlet on the same
ideological side as the lobby makes the lobby’s efforts unnecessary. Instead,
a very biased media outlet on the opposite ideological side simply makes
the lobby’s efforts unproductive. Either way, the greater the likelihood that
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the media outlet slants its reports, the lower the incentives of lobbies to
influence the information that the media outlet collects. Instead, the higher
the lobbies’ efforts the more likely the media outlet is to slant its reports.
From an ex-ante welfare point of view, voters experience a net expected
loss from the policy distortion generated by the bias of the media outlet
and/or lobbies’ influence activities. More specifically, the more voters care
about receiving accurate information, the nosier the information that they
end up receiving is and the higher their expected utility loss is. The compar-
ative statics results show that public policy measures aimed at increasing
the cost of lobbies’ efforts would reduce lobbies’ influence activities and/or
reduce news-slanting by the media (in a probabilistic sense). Thus, impos-
ing a stricter tax regime on interest groups, or more closely regulating their
influence activities, would reduce the distortion in the policy outcome and
increase voters’ welfare.
I also analyze several extensions of the benchmark model and show that
asymmetries in media bias do not generate asymmetric incentives for lob-
bies to engage in influence activities. On the other hand, asymmetries in
lobbies’ influence activities do generate asymmetric incentives for different
media outlet types to slant their reports. That is, asymmetries between lob-
bies lead to different probabilities of news-slanting by different media outlet
types. More specifically, when only the leftist (rightist) lobby is present, for
a given ex-ante bias, a rightist (leftist) media outlet has higher incentives
to slant its reports than a leftist (rightist) one. This suggests that empirical
studies aiming at measuring media bias should take into account the possi-
ble difference between the ex-post slant in a media outlet’s reports and the
ex-ante bias of the media outlet itself. I also show that a (not overly) biased
media outlet may affect the policy outcome even in the presence of rational,
Bayesian voters who know its bias. Finally, I analyze the case of direct com-
munication between special interest groups and the voters and show that
it represents a special case nested in the benchmark model. Therefore, the
results of the model also provide theoretical insights for the case where there
is no media outlet acting as a ﬁlter between lobbies and voters.
Empirical Evidence
The amount of evidence showing that special interest groups not only limit
their activities to politicians but also seek to influence voters is consider-
able. In the US, lobbies use three main types of instruments to influence
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voters: advocacy groups, issue advertising and think tanks.5 According to
the Center for Responsive Politics (2011c), in the 2004 election cycle advo-
cacy groups (527 groups) spent more than 600 million dollars trying to
influence how voters looked at the issues they were interested in. In par-
ticular, ideological and single issue advocacy groups spent between 400 and
500 million dollars.6
‘‘Issue advertisements’’ are ads run by political action committees (PACs),
advocacy groups and other kinds of lobbies (e.g., private firms), about public
policy issues (i.e., not products or candidates). Falk et al. (2006) estimate
that between 2003 and 2004, more than 400 million dollars was spent on print
and television issue advertisements in the Washington DC metropolitan area
alone.7
Think tanks are non-profit research organizations which analyze public
policy issues and advocate solutions.8 The number and the importance of
think tanks has been growing over time. Rich (2004) estimates that in 1996
there were 306 think tanks operating in the US.9 While some think tanks
are non-partisan, some others engage in ideologically oriented research. As
depicted by a 2002 Note of the Harvard Law Review, ‘‘think tanks often
provide a platform for particular viewpoints by packaging and popularizing
policy proposals’’.10 Out of the 306 think tanks listed by Rich (2004), 165
were identified as being ideologically oriented (i.e., either conservative or
liberal).
5 In other countries (e.g., western Europe) the lobbying sectors are typically informal (i.e., not
institutionalized). Thus, the evidence on lobbies’ inﬂuence over voters is mostly anecdotal. See
Beyers (2004) for EU-level evidence on grassroot activities.
6 See also Kollman (1998) for compelling evidence on the presence of extensive grassroots cam-
paigning in favor of and against the approval of the NAFTA by the US in 1993.
7 More speciﬁcally, their estimates report that 79% of the total spending on issue ads was done
by corporations. Notice that, issue advertisements are not regulated under federal campaign
ﬁnance laws. Thus, it is not possible to exactly quantify the amount of resources spent on this
type of political expenditure.
8 Think tanks are tax exempt organizations (regulated under section 501(c)(3) of the IRS code).
The main advantage of such exemption is to allow think tanks to receive unlimited contributions
from private foundations. Moreover, contributions to think tanks are tax deductible. For a
comprehensive description and discussion of think tanks’ legal status and activities see “The
Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure”, Harvard
Law Review, March 2002, 115(5): 1502–1524.
9 Rich also shows that the 80% of the think tanks in existence in 1996 were formed after 1970
and their number has been steadily growing over time. Other studies use diﬀerent classiﬁcation
of think tanks and report an even higher number of think tanks (e.g., Hellebust (1996) lists
1212 think tanks operating in 1996).
10 Source: “The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclo-
sure.” Harvard Law Review 2002: 15203.
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While in the case of ‘‘issue advertising’’ the communication between lob-
bies and voters is unﬁltered (i.e., direct), in other instances lobbies’ influence
activities are channeled through the media.11 A clear example of such ﬁl-
tered communication is media reports covering think tanks’ research. While
an unbiased media outlet would report the research of different think tanks
in a balanced way, a biased media outlet may slant its reports by selec-
tively omitting relevant information (i.e., emphasizing the results of one
think tank’s research and hiding those of another). Indeed, recent empirical
studies show the presence of this kind of bias in the media. Groseclose and
Milyo (2005) propose a measure of media bias by comparing the number of
times a media outlet cite a think tank with the number of times members of
the congress cite the same think tank. They find that, with few exceptions,
most of the US news media outlets are more leftist than the average member
of the congress.12 At the same time, the empirical literature on media has
also shown that media bias matters. That is, the media do influence voters
behavior (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gerber et al., 2009). DellaVigna
and Kaplan (2007) study the effect of the entry of Fox News in the cable
market and they find that about 3–8 percent of its viewers were indeed con-
vinced to vote Republican. Gerber et al. (2009) conducted a natural field
experiment to measure the effect of exposure to the Washington Times and
Washington Post in the month before the 2005 Virginia Gubernatorial elec-
tion. They find that individuals assigned to the Washington Post treatment
group were eight percent more likely to vote for the democratic candidate
than those belonging to the control group.13 This emerging empirical lit-
erature thus highlights the importance of considering and analyzing the
presence of biased news media acting as a ﬁlter between lobbies and voters.
Related Literature
The issue of grassroots activities and special interests’ influence on voters
has been largely overlooked by the formal literature on lobbying. At the same
11 The case of direct communication between special interest groups and voters is formally ana-
lyzed in the section discussing the extensions to the benchmark model.
12 For additional evidence on the presence of bias in the media see Ho and Quinn (2008) and
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010). See also Anderson and McLaren (2010) for anecdotal evidence
and a discussion on the political motivations of media corporations and how media can bias
their reports by selectively omitting information.
13 See also Enikopolov et al. (2010) for evidence of the persuasive eﬀects of TV in the context of
Russia. DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) provide an extensive survey of the empirical literature
on the eﬀects and the drivers of persuasive communication.
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time, the role played by the media in this context as a ﬁlter between spe-
cial interests and voters has been mostly neglected. The works most closely
related to the present paper are Baron (2005) and Yu (2005).14
Baron (2005) considers a model of hard information where an activist
lobby and an industry search for evidence on the true state of nature, and
then they have to decide whether to conceal it or report it to the media.
Baron shows that the activist lobby has an incentive to conceal while the
industry does not, moreover the media find it optimal to bias their report
in favor of the policy preferred by the activist lobby. This model, while
analyzing a more complex structure of the media market, restricts lobbies’
strategic decisions to be binary (conceal/not conceal) while I construct a
more general (and symmetric) framework where lobbies’ influence activities
are a continuous function of the incentives structure of the game and, in
particular, of the idiosyncratic bias of the media. Moreover, such a frame-
work provides a direct measure of the policy distortion arising from interest
groups’ influence activities and media bias and then to analyze the effects
of such distortion on voters’ welfare.
In Yu (2005), lobbies compete by influencing both politicians and voters.
Yu shows that such influence activities are complementary. Moreover, an
increase in the effectiveness of voters’ persuasion or awareness induces a
substitution effect between the influence activities targeted to politicians
and the one aimed towards voters. However, unlike this paper, Yu assumes
an exogenous relation between voters’ posterior beliefs and lobbies’ efforts
and does not analyze the role played by the media.
My model is also related to that of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) since
both papers look at the issue of the production of information by agents
and efficient decision making. However, the focus and thus the conclusions
of the two papers are quite different. Dewatripont and Tirole analyze the
problem of an organization which has to make a decision based on the
information provided by agents engaging in moral hazard. They show that
an advocacy system where two agents compete to produce favorable evi-
dence is, in general, a more efficient system than one with a single non-
partisan agent. In my model there is no such moral hazard problem in
information gathering given that interest groups want to produce favorable
14 Formal models on special interests inﬂuence on voters are also present in Kollman (1998) and
Grossman and Helpman (2005). In Kollman (1998) lobbies invest costly resources to signal the
salience of the issue they are interested in. In Grossman and Helpman (2001) a lobby wants to
educate the public by sending a costless message.
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evidence to ensure a beneficial political outcome. This creates strong incen-
tives to conceal unfavorable information. Therefore, in this setting, a single
unbiased agent collecting information (e.g., academia) may lead to a more
efficient policy outcome than when two lobbies advocate their respective
positions.15
The analysis also contributes to the literature on media bias. This liter-
ature has, so far, shown that the bias present in media reports may come
from two alternative types of sources. That is, the idiosyncratic preferences
of journalists (Baron, 2006), owners (Djankov et al., 2003; Anderson and
McLaren, 2010), governments (Besley and Prat, 2006) or advertisers (Ellman
and Germano, 2009; Germano and Meier, 2010; Blasco et al., 2011; Petrova,
2011) may create a supply-driven bias in media reports. On the other hand,
the endogenous demand of slanted news by viewers may result in a demand-
driven bias in news reports (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and
Shapiro, 2006; Chan and Suen, 2008; Sobbrio, 2011). In this paper, I show
that even when a media outlet does not have any biased preferences or any
incentive to produce biased reports, its reports may still be biased given that
the information it collects may be biased itself. That is, there is a source-
driven bias in media reports due to the distortion in information created by
lobbies’ influence activities.
Finally, the present paper is related to the literature on cheap-talk where
the Receiver is uncertain about the Sender’s preferences.16 The model con-
siders an environment where the Receiver (voters) does not know whether
the Sender (media outlet) is biased and at the same time does not know the
direction of the possible bias. Moreover, the probability distribution of the
signal that the Sender receives on the state of the world is also endogenously
dependent on the size and probability of its bias. I show that different types
of informative equilibria may arise depending on the size of the bias and on
the probability of the Sender being biased.
15 Indeed, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) themselves notice that “we assumed all along that moral
hazard in information acquisition made it necessary to provide powerful incentive schemes
for agents leading to advocacy [. . .]. These incentive schemes induce concealment as well as
acquisition. If information collection is easy, it makes sense to reduce the power of incentive
schemes so as to [. . .] induce truthful release of existing information” (Dewatripont and Tirole,
1999, p. 20).
16 See Morris (2001).
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The Model
In this section, I first introduced the structure of the benchmark model.
Then, I discuss the intuition and robustness of the main assumptions.
The political process involves a single issue or policy P . Specifically, there
are two alternative items in the legislative agenda: keeping the status quo
or approving a policy proposal. That is, P ∈ {0; 1} represents the policy
outcome in the [0, 1] political space, where P = 0 stands for ‘‘keeping the
status quo’’ and P = 1 for ‘‘approving the policy proposal’’. Since the focus
of the analysis is on the indirect channel of lobbies’ influence on the political
outcome, I implicitly assume that legislators are responsive to public opinion.
Hence, the implemented policy outcome is assumed to be the one preferred
by the median voter.17 Nature selects the state of the world s ∈ {A,B}
which is Nature’s private information (i.e., the state of the world is unknown
to all players). To preserve symmetry, players’ prior beliefs are assumed to
be Pr(s = A) = 1/2. These two alternative states of the world capture
the possible differences in the public value of approving/rejecting the policy
proposal. That is, by convention, if the state of the world is A then the
net benefits (from a public value perspective) of keeping the status quo are
assumed to be higher than those of approving the proposal (vice versa, if
s = B).18
Voters have quadratic utility functions:
Ui(P, di) = −(P − di)2 (1)
Voter i policy preference di is a combination of a private value component
xi and a state-dependent public value component I, i.e., di(xi, I) = xi + I,
where
I =
{
−δ if s = A
δ if s = B
(2)
that is, xi ∼ f(x) represents the idiosyncratic policy preference of voter i.
Thus, xi represents the ideal policy for voter i if he/she were to believe that
17 Assuming a dichotomous policy outcome is without loss of generality. The results naturally
extend to a model where the policy chosen by the legislators is the median voter’s preferred
policy in the [0, 1] space.
18 Alternatively, P ∈ {0; 1} could be interpreted as the political platforms of two candidates.
That is, the state of the world captures the diﬀerence between the valence (i.e., quality) of the
two alternative candidates.
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both states of the world are equally likely. Moreover, there is uncertainty
over the actual distribution of voter’s idiosyncratic preferences. Specifically,
the median voter’s idiosyncratic preference xv is assumed to be uniformly
distributed in [0, 1], i.e., xv ∼ U [0, 1].
The state-dependent public value component I captures the fact that,
regardless of their idiosyncratic policy preferences, voters also care about
the public value of approving or rejecting the policy proposal. Specifically,
δ is a parameter measuring the importance of the state-dependent public
value component in the voters’ utility functions.19 Moreover, without loss of
generality, I assume δ ∈ (0, 12 ] so that E(dv) ∈ [0, 1].20
Voters receive information on the state of the world from one media outlet
whose quadratic utility function is:
Un(P, dn) = −(P − dn)2 (3)
where also dn contains a private value component and a state-dependent
public value component, i.e., dn(ϕn, I) = ϕn + I, where I is defined as in
Equation (2). The idiosyncratic preference parameter ϕn ∈ Φ = {ϕl, ϕu, ϕr}
is private information of the media outlet. The possible media outlet idiosyn-
cratic preferences are assumed to satisfy the following:
Assumption 1. ϕl < ϕu =
1
2
< ϕr
1
2
− ϕl = ϕr − 12
Notice that E(xv) = 1/2. Hence, if the media outlet has idiosyncratic pref-
erences ϕl(ϕr) its ideal policy lies to the left (right) of the one of the
expected median voter. On the other hand, a media outlet of type ϕu and the
expected median voter share the same preferences over policies. More specif-
ically, in the following analysis a media outlet is referred to be ‘‘unbiased’’
19 Notice that having a more general speciﬁcation of voters’ utility functions would not change
the results in any signiﬁcant way. For example:
di(xi, I) = (xi)I , with I =
{
δ if s = A
1/δ if s = B
and δ ≥ 1.
That is the policy preferences of more centrist voters would have a higher correlation with the
true state of the world with respect to the ones of more extremists ones. Notice also that the
presence of “stubborn” voters (i.e., voters whose preferences are not state-contingent), would
not change the results.
20 Clearly, for δ = 0 the model becomes a pure private value one.
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if ϕn = ϕu.21 A media outlet is referred to be ‘‘leftist’’ (‘‘rightist’’) if ϕn = ϕl
(ϕn = ϕr). Moreover, the possible bias of the leftist and rightist media out-
let types is assumed to be symmetric. The probability distribution of the
media outlet’s preferences, g(ϕn), is common knowledge and it is such that
Pr(ϕn = ϕl) = Pr(ϕn = ϕr) = y.22 That is, the media outlet is unbiased
with probability (1 − 2y) and has instead a bias |ϕn − 12 | in a direction or
another with probability y.
Two competing lobbies (indexed by a and b) exert efforts ea and eb, respec-
tively, to affect the distribution of a binary signal z ∈ {zA, zB} that the
media outlet receives on the state of the world. Lobbies’ preferences are
γa = 0 and γb = 1. That is, lobby a wants to keep the status quo while lobby
b wants the policy proposal to be approved. Then, lobby i quadratic utility
function is:
Wi(P, γi, ei) = −(P − γi)2 − C(ei) (4)
where C is the cost function of effort, which is assumed to be linear (i.e.,
C ′(e) = c > 0).23
The likelihood of the signal z ∈ Z = {zA, zB} received by the media
outlet depends on the true state of the world and on lobbies’ influence activ-
ities. This captures an environment where both lobbies spend resources to
produce/collect hard information in favor of their preferred policy.24 Specif-
ically, I model this competition between lobbies as a ‘‘race for evidence’’
where one has an advantage over the other. That is, lobbies have different
hazard rates depending on whether they are lobbying for ‘‘the right cause’’
or not. Thus assuming the time at which each lobby wins the race, τ, being
exponentially distributed:
Pr(τ(ea) ≤ t|s = A) = 1 − exp{−(ea + η)τ} (5)
Pr(τ(eb) ≤ t|s = A) = 1 − exp{−(eb)τ} (6)
Analogous probabilities applies when the state is B. That is to say, for τ → 0,
if the state of the world is s = A, then lobby a wins the race and, thus,
21 Notice that the results would not change assuming the presence of an unbiased media outlet
with a purely public value utility function. That is, alternatively, a media outlet could be
deﬁned as “unbiased” if du = 0 for s = A and du = 1 for s = B. Hence, the deﬁnition
of unbiased media outlet does not have to rely on the expected median voter’s idiosyncratic
preferences.
22 The support of g(ϕn) is simply assumed to be [0, 1].
23 The analysis generalizes to convex cost functions.
24 Obviously, whenever a lobby ﬁnds an unfavorable piece of hard information it has always an
incentive to conceal it.
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has the media outlet receiving signal zA, with an instantaneous probability
equal to ea + η, where η is a positive parameter measuring the importance
of the truth in this game. Instead, lobby b has an instantaneous probability
of winning the race simply equal to eb.25 That is, the higher η is, the greater
the likelihood that the amount of hard information in support of the true
state of the world is higher than the one in support of the other state.
Defining vazA (v
a
zB) as the net expected benefit that lobby a gets when
signal zA (zB) is realized, lobby a expected payoff when the state is s = A is:
Wa(ea, eb, η, vazA , v
a
zB |s = A)
= vazA
∫ ∞
0
(ea + η) exp{−(ea + η)t} exp{−(eb)t}dt
+ vazB
∫ ∞
0
eb exp{−(eb)t} exp{−(ea + η)t}dt
Hence:
Wa(ea, eb, η, vazA , v
a
zB |s = A) = vazA
ea + η
ea + eb + η
+ vazB
eb
ea + eb + η
(7)
Similarly, lobby b expected payoff when the state is s = A is:
Wb(ea, eb, η, vbzA , v
b
zB |s = A) = vbzA
ea + η
ea + eb + η
+ vbzB
eb
ea + eb + η
(8)
Thus, the probabilities of receiving a correct signal in a given state of the
world can be denoted as follows:
hA(ea, eb, η) = Pr(zA|s = A) = ea + η
ea + eb + η
(9)
hB(ea, eb, η) = Pr(zB|s = B) = eb + η
ea + eb + η
(10)
Hence, the structure of the competition between lobbies can be seen as a
State Contingent Contest-Success Function (SCCSF). In this contest-success
function lobbies exert efforts to win the prize represented by the signal
received by the media outlet. That is, it is a straightforward generalization
of the Contest-Success Function (CSF) introduced by Tullock (1980) and
axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996).26
25 In other words, lobbies have state-contingent hazard rates, i.e., ζ(ea|s = A) = ea + η and
ζ(eb|s = A) = eb (vice versa when s = B).
26 A detailed and formal characterization of the properties of this SCCSF is available upon request
to the author.
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Lobbies a 
and b exert  
ea and eb
Nature decides 
the state of 
nature, xv and ϕ n.
The media outlet observes 
{ }BA zzz ,∈  and sends 
{ }BA mmm ,∈ to voters 
Voters observe m 
and update their 
beliefs
Median voter’s preferred policy
outcome is implemented  
and payoffs are realized 
Figure 1. Timing of the game.
After having received the signal, the media outlet decides upon the (cost-
less) message m ∈ M = {mA,mB} to send to voters. Hence, the game
between the media outlet and voters takes the form of a cheap-talk game.
Indeed, as it is usually assumed in the literature on media bias (e.g.,
Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Ellman and Germano, 2009; Anderson and
McLaren, 2010), the media outlet can slant its reports by selectively omitting
relevant information, that is by simply hiding unfavorable evidence (e.g.,
show the benefits and hide the costs of approving the policy proposal).27
Notice that, even though there is uncertainty on the media outlet’s type, the
message space M is binary. Indeed, given that there are just two states of
the world and the media outlet may receive only two signals, voters’ uncer-
tainty is just relative to such signals. That is, a binary message space is
sufficient to capture the cheap-talk communication between the media outlet
and voters.28
Given the message received from the media outlet, voters update their
beliefs on the state of the world according to Bayes’ rule. That is, they
discount for the possible slant present in the media outlet’s report arising
from lobbies’ influence activities and the media outlet’s bias. Then, in the
last stage of the game, the policy outcome preferred by the median voter is
implemented. The timing of the game is summarized in Figure 1.
Discussion: Model Assumptions
In this section I discuss the intuition and robustness of the main assumptions
of the model described in the previous section.
27 That is, the media outlet may simply hide any unfavorable (and hard) information and present
only favorable (and hard) information. Hence, even within this cheap-talk framework, the
media outlet is always presenting hard and veriﬁable evidence (i.e., it is never providing false
information).
28 See Morris (2001) for a similar cheap-talk model (i.e., where the sender’s type is private infor-
mation) with two states of the world and a binary message space.
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Voters’ preferences. While the policy outcome is, by definition, dichoto-
mous (i.e., either approve the policy proposal or keep the status quo), voters’
preferences lie in a continuous interval. An example may help to clarify the
structure of the voters’ utility function. Suppose that voters have to decide
on a policy proposal imposing stricter environmental regulations on the
industry sector. Let the states of the world be A = ‘‘strong effects of pollu-
tion on global warming’’ and B = ‘‘mild effects of pollution on global warm-
ing’’. Each voter has some idiosyncratic preferences regarding the impor-
tance of protecting the environment. Nevertheless, in order to decide whether
he/she prefers the policy proposal to be approved or not, the voter also
takes into account the information he/she receives on the likelihood of the
state of the world. For example, if voters receive (credible) reports saying
that pollution does not have a strong impact on global warming (s = B),
each of them would revise downward his/her idea of the benefits deriving
from reducing pollution. Instead, if voters receive the opposite report they
would revise upward their beliefs on the importance of implementing a strict
environmental regulation. Thus, the median voter’s ideal policy ultimately
depends on his/her idiosyncratic preferences and his/her posterior beliefs on
the state of the world.29 As the section describing the interactions between
lobbies, media outlet and voters shows, a higher (lower) value of the median
voter’s ideal policy simply corresponds to a higher probability of the policy
proposal being approved (rejected).
Media outlet’s bias. Assumption 1 is meant to capture a situation in
which the media outlet is on average unbiased but with some exogenous
probability it may turn out to be either leftist or rightist with respect to
a given issue. I assume such symmetry in the media outlet’s types only to
avoid introducing any exogenous asymmetry in the benchmark model. The
section presenting the extensions to the benchmark model provides several
robustness checks with respect to Assumption 1 by considering more real-
istic assumptions about the media outlet’s bias. That is, I analyze a case
where the media outlet has a systematic bias (i.e., voters know whether the
media outlet is leftist or rightist but there is uncertainty on the strength
29 This speciﬁcation of the voters’ utility function is similar to the one of bidders in an aﬃliated
value auction. In the same way the valuation of the object is correlated across bidders in an
aﬃliated value auction, the value of approving the policy proposal is correlated across voters.
For a similar speciﬁcation of the voters’ utility function see, for example, Aragones and Palfrey
(2002).
Indirect Lobbying and Media Bias 249
of such bias). I also consider an extension where there is no uncertainty on
the media outlet’s bias (i.e., the media outlet’s bias is common knowledge).
Finally, I also analyze an extension where there are multiple media out-
lets. The main results of the benchmark are robust with respect to all these
alternative assumptions.
Media outlet’s preferences. The fact that the media outlet is just a
political actor in the model (i.e., it is not explicitly maximizing profits) is
without loss of generality. If the media outlet was a profit maximizer, given
that in the model voters value unbiased information, it would have a strictly
dominant strategy of not slanting its reports. The model would thus be
equivalent to the case where the media outlet is unbiased with probability
one. On the other hand, if the media outlet was maximizing profits and at
the same time had a political agenda, then it would care about both the true
state of the world (which is reflected in the state-contingent public value
component of its utility function) and about its idiosyncratic preferences
(which is reflected in the private value component of its utility function).
Thus, the specification of the media outlet’s utility function is a reduced
form of the one arising in a model where the media outlet’s utility function
were given by a convex combination of its profits and (possibly) its political
preferences. Since the analysis is mainly focused on how the media outlet’s
bias interacts with the endogenous bias arising from lobbies’ influence activ-
ities, I consider the media outlet preferences, and hence the media outlet’s
bias, as exogenous. Following the literature on media bias, such exogenous
bias may simply be the result of the idiosyncratic preferences of journalists,
owners or advertisers.30
Lobbies’ eﬀorts and signal space. The signal received by the media
outlet can be seen as a reduced form of the media outlet’s investigative
journalism. In other words, the signal that the media outlet receives can be
interpreted as indicating whether the evidence that it collected in favor of a
state of the world is stronger than the one in favor of the other state (i.e.,
amount of hard information in favor of one state higher than the one in favor
of the other state). From a public value perspective, in both states approv-
ing or rejecting the policy proposal may have costs and benefits. Indeed,
typically, there is mixed evidence on the efficiency of implementing a policy
30 See Djankov et al. (2003), Baron (2006), Besley and Prat (2006), Ellman and Germano (2009),
Anderson and McLaren (2010), Germano and Meier (2010), and Blasco et al. (2011).
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(e.g., the costs and benefits of reducing pollution, the effectiveness of the
death penalty in preventing crime, the effects of gun control on citizens’
security and so on). Thus lobbies are able to find hard information on both
the benefits and on the costs of each policy outcome in both states. However
the amount of such costs and benefits differs in the two states of the world.
That is, the true state of the world plays an important role in the evidence
collected by the media outlet. Thus, ceteris paribus, it is more likely that
the overall evidence is in favor of the lobby on the ‘‘correct’’ side.31 Clearly,
each single piece of evidence produced and presented by each lobby is hard
and verifiable (and thus not influenced in itself by lobbies’ efforts). How-
ever, the overall amount of evidence available to the media outlet in favor
of a given policy (constituted by a collection of hard and verifiable pieces of
information) is going to depend crucially on lobbies’ efforts.
On the other hand, the fact that lobbies’ efforts are unobservable is meant
to capture the fact that the media outlet and voters cannot perfectly dis-
entangle which piece of evidence is coming from lobbies’ influence activities
and which comes from independent sources. Michaels (2008) provides several
examples of evidence produced by scientists paid by industries or single firms
to produce favorable scientific reports/articles (e.g., questioning the cancer
mortality rate of factory workers from benzene exposure).32 Nevertheless,
even though lobbies’ efforts are assumed to not be directly observable by
other agents, given that the media outlet and voters hold rational expecta-
tions, they always perfectly anticipate the optimal level of effort exerted by
each lobby in equilibrium. That is, lobbies are never able to fool the media
outlet and voters in equilibrium.
The Interactions among Lobbies, the Media Outlet and Voters
In this section, I discuss the strategic interactions among lobbies, the media
outlet and voters and then derive the structure of the perfected Bayesian
equilibrium of the game.33 In the last stage voters update their beliefs
according to Bayes’ rule and then choose their preferred policy outcome
31 See also Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) for a model of trials where the party on the truth side
has a natural but not perfect advantage.
32 As pointed out by Michaels (2008, p. xi): “Industry has learned that debating the science is
much easier and more eﬀective than debating the policy”.
33 Clearly, since lobbies’ eﬀorts are unobservable, the PBE is a rational expectation equilibrium.
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(i.e., keep the status quo or approve the policy proposal). The media out-
let chooses its optimal strategy taking into account how the message that
it is going to send to voters would affect voters’ preferred policy outcome.
Finally, anticipating all such interactions, each lobby decides upon the effort
to exert in order to try to influence the beliefs that voters hold on the state
of the world.
Voters
Given the message sent by the media outlet, m ∈ {mA,mB}, voters form
their posterior beliefs using Bayes’ rule. Hence, voters have the following
expected utility:
Ui(xi,m) = Pr(s = A|m)[−(P − (xi − δ))2]
+Pr(s = B|m)[−(P − (xi + δ))2] (11)
That is, the median voter’s ideal policy is:
κ
∗
v (m) = xv + δ[1 − 2Pr(s = A|m)] (12)
Hence, since legislators are assumed to be responsive to the median voter’s
preferences, they will approve the policy proposal if and only if κ∗v (m) ≥ 1/2.
That is, the ex-post policy outcome is:
P ∗v (m) =


0 if κ∗v (m) <
1
2
1 if κ∗v (m) ≥
1
2
Thus, the expected policy outcome is:
Pˆ (m) = E[P ∗v (m)] = Pr
(
κ
∗
v (m) ≥
1
2
)
=
1
2
+ δ[1 − 2Pr(s = A|m)] (13)
In other words, even though the ex-post policy outcome P ∗v (m) is, by def-
inition, dichotomous (i.e., either keep the status quo or approve the policy
proposal), the expected policy outcome Pˆ (m) lies in the interval [0, 1]. Ana-
lyzing the optimal strategies of lobbies and of the media outlet with respect
to this (continuous) expected policy outcome allows to easily derive all the
necessary equilibrium results while maintaining a straightforward interpre-
tation of the model. Indeed, a higher (lower) value of the expected policy
outcome simply corresponds to a higher probability of the policy proposal
being approved (rejected).
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The Media Outlet
The media outlet acts as a ﬁlter in this game. The private cost that any
individual should bear in order to acquire direct information is assumed to
be higher than any private benefit. Hence, voters rely on the media outlet
to receive information on a given issue.34 The expected utility for a media
outlet having idiosyncratic preferences ϕn is:
Un(ϕn, z, P ) = Pr(s = A|z)[−(P−(ϕn−δ))2]+Pr(s = B|z)[−(P−(ϕn+δ))2]
The media outlet observes the signal on the state of the world and updates
its beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. Since the media outlet has rational expec-
tations, its posterior beliefs upon receiving signal zA or zB depend on the
expected effort that lobbies exert, eˆa and eˆb. Therefore, its posterior beliefs
are as follows:
Pr(s = A|zA) = hA(eˆa, eˆb, η)1 − hB(eˆa, eˆb, η) + hA(eˆa, eˆb, η)
Pr(s = A|zB) = 1 − hA(eˆa, eˆb, η)1 − hA(eˆa, eˆb, η) + hB(eˆa, eˆb, η)
Hence, the media outlet’s ideal policy upon receiving signal z is:
φ∗
n
(z) = ϕn + δ [1 − 2Pr(s = A|z)] (14)
Therefore, the optimal policy outcome from the media outlet’s perspective is:
P ∗n(z) =


0 if φ∗
n
(z) <
1
2
1 if φ∗
n
(z) ≥ 1
2
The interaction between the media outlet and voters assumes here the typ-
ical structure of a cheap-talk game. By selectively omitting (i.e., hiding)
unfavorable evidence, the media outlet is able to slant the evidence collected.
Thus, the media outlet chooses m ∈ M to maximize the probability of the
ex-post policy outcome P ∗v (m) being equal to P ∗n(z).
34 For example, any single voter would ﬁnd it too costly to acquire direct information on the
eﬀects of pollution on global warming. The opportunity cost or simply the knowledge required
to analyze such information would far exceed any private beneﬁt. News media thus constitute
the most eﬃcient way to acquire information for any single citizen.
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The (possibly mixed) strategy for a media outlet with preferences ϕn is
a mapping from the signal space into a probability distribution over the
message space:
σ(ϕn):Z → Σ(M)
where Σ(M) is the space of probability distributions over the message
space M. Specifically, a media outlet with preferences ϕn has two different
types of pure strategies, pooling or separating respectively. A media outlet
with preference ϕn plays a pooling strategy if σ(ϕn|zA) = σ(ϕn|zB) = m∗.
Instead, a media outlet with preference ϕn plays a separating strategy if
σ(ϕn|zA) = mˆ and σ(ϕn|zB) = m˜, with m˜ = mˆ. A mixed strategy simply
specifies the probability that a media outlet is playing a separating strat-
egy.35
Lobbies
Lobbies know that the expected equilibrium policy outcome depends on vot-
ers’ posterior beliefs and thus on the message of the media outlet. Since
voters have rational expectations their posterior beliefs upon receiving mes-
sage m depend on the expected effort that lobbies a and b exert in a given
equilibrium, eˆ∗a and eˆ∗b respectively. In other words, the expected policy out-
come is a function of the expected efforts:
Pˆ (m) = Pˆ (m, eˆ∗a, eˆ
∗
b) =
1
2
+ δ[1 − 2µ∗(s = A|m, eˆ∗a, eˆ∗b)] (15)
Thus, conditional on the media outlet’s message, from lobbies’ ex-ante per-
spective, the implemented policy outcome is not affected by their effort deci-
sion. Therefore, lobbies choose their efforts in order to influence the signal
that the media outlet receives and hence the message that voters get. In other
words, lobbies’ expected utilities depend on the exerted efforts (which affect
Pr(mA) and Pr(mB)) and on the expected efforts (which affect the median
voter’s posterior beliefs for a given message). Thus, from Equation (4) lobby
a and lobby b expected utilities are:
Wa(ea, eb, eˆ∗a, eˆ
∗
b , η) = −Pr(mA|ea, eb, η)(Pˆ (mA, eˆ∗a, eˆ∗b , η))2
−Pr(mB|ea, eb, η)(Pˆ (mB, eˆ∗a, eˆ∗b , η))2 − C(ea) (16)
35 Note that restricting the media outlet to always send a message is without loss of general-
ity. Allowing the media outlet to not send any message would not change the results in any
signiﬁcant way. A formal analysis of this case is available upon request to the author.
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Wb(ea, eb, eˆ∗a, eˆ
∗
b , η) = −Pr(mA|ea, eb, η)(1 − Pˆ (mA, eˆ∗a, eˆ∗b , η))2
−Pr(mB|ea, eb, η)(1 − Pˆ (mB, eˆ∗a, eˆ∗b , η))2 − C(eb)
(17)
In their optimization problem lobbies take into account that the expected
policy outcome, Pˆ , depends on which message voters receive from the media
outlet. Moreover, lobbies anticipate that such a message depends on the
possible media outlet’s bias (i.e., on the strategy of each media outlet’s type)
and their expected efforts. Thus each lobby faces a different optimization
problem depending on whether it is expecting the media outlet to be playing
a separating, pooling or mixed strategy, in the cheap-talk game with voters.
In what follows, I refer to media outlet’s bias as the exogenous difference
between the media outlet and the median voter’s expected idiosyncratic
preferences (i.e., |ϕn − 12 |). I denote as information slant the endogenous
noise in the information that agents receive due to the presence of the media
outlet’s bias and/or lobbies’ influence activities. Finally, I indicate as policy
distortion the difference between the expected policy outcome with and
without the information slant.
Informative Equilibria
This section characterizes the unique informative equilibrium of the game.
Specifically, as shown by the following proposition, depending on how large
the possible bias of the media outlet is, different types of informative equi-
libria may arise.
Proposition 1 For any given set Φ of media outlet idiosyncratic
preferences, there is a unique informative equilibrium. Speciﬁcally,
∃ϕPIl , ϕMIl with ϕPIl < ϕMIl such that :
(i) If ϕl ∈ [ϕMIl , 12 ] there is a unique informative equilibrium where each
biased media outlet type adopts a separating strategy (maximally
informative equilibrium).
(ii) If ϕl ∈ (ϕPIl , ϕMIl ) there is a unique informative equilibrium where
each biased media outlet type adopts a mixed strategy (semi-
separating equilibrium).
(iii) If ϕl < ϕPIl there is a unique informative equilibrium where each
biased media outlet type pools on the message most preferred by the
lobby on its side (partially informative equilibrium).
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That is, ϕPIl and ϕ
MI
l represent the leftist media outlet no-deviation
thresholds in a partially informative and maximally informative equilib-
rium, respectively.36 Two corollaries follow immediately from the above
proposition.
Corollary 1 Lobbies exert a lower eﬀort in an equilibrium where they expect
the media outlet to slant its report with a higher probability. That is:
ePI < eSS < eMI
Moreover :
∂eSS
∂q
< 0 and lim
q→0
eSS = eMI , lim
q→1
eSS = ePI
where q represents the probability of the media outlet adopting a pooling
strategy in a semi-separating equilibrium.
When the media outlet chooses to disregard the information it collects
(i.e., the signal it receives on the state of the world), lobbies just waste
resources in trying to influence such information (i.e., signal). Instead, when
the media outlet does not bias its report and sends a message according
to the signal it receives (maximally informative equilibrium), lobbies have
strong incentives to exert effort to influence the distribution of this signal.
Hence, the greater the likelihood that the media outlet adopts a pooling
strategy, the lower the incentives of lobbies to engage in influence activities.
The second corollary of Proposition 1 points out that the higher the lob-
bies’ expected efforts the higher (in a probabilistic sense) the slant that the
media outlet introduces in its report.
Corollary 2 The media outlet incentives to slant its reports are increasing
in lobbies’ expected eﬀorts.
By rational expectations, in equilibrium the expected effort is equal to
the effort exerted by lobbies. Therefore, since the higher the effort exerted
by lobbies the noisier the signal that the media outlet receives, this result
is suggesting that the more controversial and unclear the information that
the media outlet collects is, the greater the likelihood that the media outlet
slants such information. Instead, when lobbies do not engage in influence
36 Symmetric no-deviation thresholds exist for the rightist media outlet.
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Figure 2. Media bias and informative equilibria.
activities (i.e., ea = eb = 0), the media outlet always receives the correct
signal and thus it slants such information only when it has quite extreme
preferences. Figure 2 illustrates the possible types of informative equilibria
that can arise depending on where the media outlet’s idiosyncratic prefer-
ences lie.
Therefore, Proposition 1 implies that the higher the possible bias of the
media outlet, the lower the equilibrium level of effort that lobbies exert.
Indeed, if the media outlet turns out to be strongly biased in the opposite
direction of the lobby, no matter how much effort the lobby exerts and
whether it lobbies for the efficient policy or not, the media outlet always
sends a message that drives the median voter’s ideal policy further from
the lobby’s optimal one. Moreover, even if the media outlet turn out to
be strongly biased in favor of the lobby’s optimal policy, the lobby’s effort
would be totally worthless by virtue of being unnecessary. In this case, the
media outlet is the one taking care of trying to influence voters’ beliefs in
the direction favorable to the lobby. Therefore, in either case, the possibility
of facing a very biased media outlet lowers the incentives of lobbies to spend
resources on affecting the signal distribution.
Notice that for intermediate values of the media outlet’s bias, an equilib-
rium in pure strategies cannot exist. This is due to the discontinuity in the
equilibrium level of effort of lobbies: for ϕl < ϕPIl lobbies play according to a
partially informative equilibrium and put an effort equal to ePI . Conversely,
for ϕl = ϕPIl + ε, the leftist media outlet has an incentive to deviate from
its pooling strategy. However, this gives higher incentives to lobbies to exert
a higher level of effort and thus increases the incentives of the media outlet
to play a pooling strategy. Therefore, for ϕPIl < ϕl < ϕ
MI
l , the only possible
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equilibrium is a semi-separating equilibrium where lobbies exert effort eSS .
Moreover, to any ϕl in this interval corresponds a unique optimal proba-
bility of the media outlet slanting its reports, q, which supports the unique
semi-separating equilibrium.
It is also important to point out that, as it will be discussed in the exten-
sions section, the maximally informative equilibrium characterized above is
equivalent to the equilibrium arising when there is no media outlet acting
as a filter between special interest groups and voters (e.g., as in the case
of issue advertising). Therefore, the above results (and the following ones)
relative to the maximally informative equilibrium apply also to the case of
direct communication between lobbies and voters.
Comparative Statics
The message that voters receive contains two different kinds of slant. The
first one is a source-driven slant introduced by lobbies in the signal that
the media outlet receives (lobbies-induced slant). At the same time, in a
partially informative and semi-separating type of equilibrium, the media
outlet’s message contains also a supply-driven slant due to the idiosyncratic
bias of the media outlet (media-induced slant). This section analyzes how a
change in the parameters of the model affects these two kinds of slant and,
thus, the overall noise in the message that voters receive.
Proposition 2 For any given Φ and ∀ϕn ∈ Φ:
1. An increase in δ strictly increases the equilibrium level of lobbies’ eﬀorts
e∗ and weakly decreases Pr(σ(ϕn|zA) = σ(ϕn|zB)).
2. An increase in c or in y strictly decreases the equilibrium level of lobbies’
eﬀorts e∗ and/or weakly decreases Pr(σ(ϕn|zA) = σ(ϕn|zB)).
In other words, a higher δ leads to a higher level of lobbies’ efforts and a
weakly lower probability of news-slanting by the media outlet. Specifically,
an increase in the importance of the public value component in the voters’
utility function has two effects. A higher δ implies a larger ‘‘space for influ-
ence’’, therefore the higher δ is, the stronger the lobbies’ incentives to try
to influence voters’ beliefs (higher lobbies-induced slant). Hence, the more
voters care about receiving accurate information, the noisier the received
information is. On the other hand, a higher δ also decreases the relative
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importance of the media outlet’s idiosyncratic bias. Hence, the higher δ is,
the lower the media outlet’s incentives to slant its reports (lower media-
induced slant). Therefore, a higher δ has opposite effects on the incentives
of lobbies and of the media outlet: it increases the lobbies-induced slant and
it reduces the media-induced slant.
An increase in c has two effects. It decreases lobbies’ incentives to exert
effort and thus increases the quality of the signal received by the media
outlet. As a consequence the media outlet has lower incentives to slant its
reports. However, this last effect increases lobbies’ incentives to exert effort.
Thus the two effects of an increase in c on lobbies’ efforts go in opposite
directions. Nevertheless, the net effect on the slant in information is always
negative. Notice that in an SS equilibrium the net effect of an increase in
c on lobbies’ efforts is null (the probability of news-slanting by the media
outlet decreases exactly to compensate the decrease in c). Knowing that
the marginal cost of effort is higher, the media outlet can choose a lower
probability of slanting without inducing an increase in lobbies’ efforts. Thus,
in such a case, an increase in c decreases the overall slant in the message that
voters receive not because it decreases the lobbies-induced slant but because
it decreases the media-induced slant.
A similar effect and reasoning applies to an increase in the probability of
the media outlet being biased, i.e., y. The policy outcome would be more
efficient if everyone attributed a low probability to the media outlet being
unbiased. Thus, knowing for sure that the media outlet is actually biased
would lead to a lower policy distortion. Indeed, within a PI type of equilib-
rium (or within an SS type), a lower y leads to a higher policy distortion
since the incentives of lobbies to engage in influence activities are higher.
Lobbies, Policy Distortion and Welfare
I now analyze the efficiency and welfare implications of this game. Notice
that given Equations (9) and (10), if lobbies were to not engage in any influ-
ence activity and there was no news-slanting by the media outlet, the policy
outcome would not have any distortion. Indeed, voters would learn the true
state of the world and no distortion would be present in the policy outcome.
That is, the decision to keep the status quo or approve the policy proposal
would always coincide with the one maximizing the median voter’s ex-post
utility. Hence, in order to evaluate the ex-ante policy distortion arising from
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lobbies’ influence activities, the expected policy outcome arising in a maxi-
mally informative (MI ), partially informative (PI ), and semi-separating (SS )
type of equilibrium should be compared with the one arising when there is
neither any lobbies-induced slant nor any media-induced slant. I denote this
policy outcome as ‘‘no-slant’’ (NS ). Therefore, the ex-ante policy distortion
in an informative equilibrium of type κ = MI ,PI ,SS is given by:
Λκ = Pr(s = A)|PˆNSm (s = A) − E(Pˆ κm|s = A)|
+Pr(s = B)|PˆNSm (s = B) − E(Pˆ κm|s = B)| (18)
where E(P κm|s = A) represents the expected policy outcome when the state
is A and E(P κm|s = B) is the expected policy outcome when the state is
B. On the other hand, the net utility loss of voter i in the informative
equilibrium of type κ = MI ,PI ,SS (with respect to the no-slant policy
outcome) is given by:
(∆Ui)κ = |UNSi (xi) − Uκi (xi)| (19)
The following proposition summarizes the results on the expected policy
distortion and its welfare implications.
Proposition 3 ∀κ = MI,PI, SS and ∀ c < δη :
1. Λκ > 0. Moreover, Λκ is strictly increasing in δ and strictly decreasing
in c.
2. (∆Ui)κ > 0, ∀ i. Moreover, (∆Ui)κ is strictly increasing in Λκ,∀ i.
Despite the fact that, by assumption, the policy outcome is the one pre-
ferred by the median voter, there is still an ex-ante distortion. Even though
voters are rational and discount the possible presence of slant in the infor-
mation they receive, the noise that lobbies (and the media outlet) introduce
in the political process prevents them from always choosing the no-slant
optimal policy outcome.
The expected policy distortion is positively related to the size of the state-
contingent public value component of the voter utility function (i.e., δ). This
result suggests that, ceteris paribus, a higher policy distortion is expected to
arise in an issue like global warming than in an issue like abortion where pref-
erences are mostly idiosyncratic. On the other hand, the lower the lobbies’
influence over the signal received by the media outlet is (i.e., the lower c
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is, and the higher η is), the lower the expected policy distortion. Voters,
regardless of their idiosyncratic preferences, would prefer an equilibrium
without any influence activity. Moreover, their expected utility loss is larger
the higher the expected policy distortion is.
Proposition 3 has immediate policy implications. Specifically, it implies
that public policy measures aimed at increasing the cost of lobbies influence
activities would reduce the expected policy distortion and increase voters’
welfare. In the US, advocacy groups and think tanks are tax-exempt orga-
nizations that can raise unlimited contributions from private foundations.
Moreover, contributions to think tanks are tax-deductible and the activi-
ties of 527 groups are not regulated by the Federal Election Commission
(FEC). Therefore, the above proposition suggests that regulating the influ-
ence activities of advocacy groups more closely, requiring higher academic
and deontological standards for think tanks research and imposing a stricter
tax regime to these organizations, would all be welfare improving public
policy measures.37 Indeed, Proposition 2 implies that such measures would
either reduce lobbies’ influence activities or reduce news-slanting by the
media outlet (in a probabilistic sense) or reduce both.
Media Bias, Policy Distortion and Welfare
The previous section analyzed the distortion in the policy outcome and its
effects on the expected utilities of voters regardless of which equilibrium is
actually in place (i.e., regardless of the actual size of the possible bias of the
media outlet). This section instead analyzes the effect that the media outlet’s
idiosyncratic bias has on the policy distortion and on the welfare of voters.
The following proposition shows that, from an ex-ante point of view, voters
are indifferent when facing a media outlet with a large potential bias or one
with a low or no bias since the lobbies-induced slant would counterbalance
the lower media-induced slant.
Proposition 4 ΛPI = ΛMI and UPIi (xi) = U
MI
i (xi).
37 Consistent with the idea of imposing a stricter tax regime to these organizations, the US
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has recently informed ﬁve large advocacy groups donors that
their contributions will be subject to gift taxes, i.e., 35 percent on anything over $13,000 a
year (Strom, 2011).
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As pointed out by Proposition 2, the overall slant present in the media out-
let’s message is the result of two different types of slants: the lobbies-induced
slant and the media-induced slant. Voters know that when the possible bias
of the media outlet is low, the media outlet always sends truthful reports
(i.e., it does not slant the information it receives). However, in this case,
lobbies have strong incentives to exert effort. Therefore, the message that
voters receive in a maximally informative equilibrium has no media-induced
slant but incorporates a high lobbies-induced slant. Instead, the message
that voters observe in a partially informative equilibrium contains a high
media-induced slant (in a probabilistic sense) and a low lobbies-induced slant.
Hence, voters would actually be indifferent among the different types of
equilibria since the overall expected slant in the message they receive would
be the same.
Extensions
In this section, I briefly describe and discuss several possible extensions and
robustness checks of the benchmark model.38
Known Direction of the Media Outlet’s Bias
Here I consider a more realistic assumption regarding the beliefs about the
media outlet’s bias, with respect to the benchmark model. That is, I dis-
cuss here the case where the direction of the media outlet’s bias is common
knowledge but the strength of such bias is private information. Suppose, for
example, that voters and lobbies know that the media outlet is leftist but
they do not know how leftist it is. That is, let the space of possible media
outlet types be Φ = {ϕHl , ϕLl } with ϕHl < ϕLl < 12 and Pr(ϕn = ϕHl ) = y.
Hence, with probability y the media outlet has a large leftist bias and with
probability (1 − y) it has a small leftist bias.
When lobbies are ex-ante symmetric their incentives to exert effort remain
symmetric even though the media outlet’s possible strategies are not sym-
metric. To understand why this is true, consider a partially informative type
of equilibrium. In this type of equilibrium, the small bias type adopts a sep-
arating strategy and the large bias type adopts a pooling one. Hence, from
the rightist lobby’s perspective, exerting an effort to influence the informa-
tion that the media outlet collects is a waste with probability y (probability
38 Detailed formal proofs for these extensions are available upon request to the author.
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of large bias type) and is productive with probability (1−y). Similarly, from
the leftist lobby’s point of view, exerting effort is unnecessary (and thus a
waste) with probability y and it is productive with probability (1−y). There-
fore, asymmetries in the media outlet’s bias do not generate asymmetric
incentives and thus the equilibrium remains symmetric.
No Uncertainty on the Media Outlet’s Bias
Suppose now that voters and lobbies are informed about the exact bias of
the media outlet (i.e., the media outlet’s bias is common knowledge). When
the media outlet has a large bias it would like to slant its reports. Therefore,
voters would disregard the message coming from a very biased media outlet
because it is simply uninformative. On the other hand, in such uninformative
equilibrium lobbies would have no incentive to engage in influence activities,
thus the signal that a very biased media outlet receives is very likely to be
correct. Corollary 2 implies that in such a case the media outlet has lower
incentives to adopt a pooling strategy and thus it does so only when it
has a very large bias. Hence, for intermediate values of the media outlet’s
bias the unique equilibrium is still a semi-separating one. Moreover, in such
equilibrium lobbies exert a lower effort with respect to the one they exert in
the benchmark case because of the certainty of facing a biased media outlet.
Hence, the model shows that a (not overly) biased media outlet may affect
the policy outcome even in the presence of rational, Bayesian consumers
who know its bias. On the other hand, when the media outlet has a very
high bias, the unique equilibrium is an uninformative one where voters do
not modify their prior beliefs and lobbies exert no effort.39 Finally, for low
values of the media outlet’s bias the unique equilibrium is still a maximally
informative one. Figure 3 illustrates the possible types of equilibria that
may arise in this case, as a function of the media outlet’s bias.
Multiple Media Outlets
Suppose that there are two media outlets with idiosyncratic preferences
ϕ1n and ϕ
2
n. Let m1 be the message of the first media outlet and m2 that
39 Notice that this case highlights the fundamental diﬀerence between a media outlet and a lobby.
If the media outlet were to have extreme preferences (as the ones of a lobby), its reports would
simply be uninformative and thus it would neither have any policy inﬂuence nor get any proﬁts
from readers and/or advertisers.
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Figure 3. Equilibria with no uncertainty on the media outlet’s bias.
of the second media outlet. Since voters value unbiased information, when
updating their beliefs they take into account the message with the lowest
slant. Therefore, whenever one of the two media outlets adopts a separating
strategy, the unique equilibrium is a maximally informative one regardless
of the type and size of the other media outlet’s bias. The more interesting
cases arise when the two media outlets have biases going in opposite direc-
tions and such biases are not small (i.e., the equilibrium is not a maximally
informative one). Suppose, for example, that the first media outlet is left-
ist and the second is rightist. Suppose also, without loss of generality, that
their idiosyncratic preferences are symmetric with respect to the ones of the
median voter (i.e., |ϕ1n − 12 | = |ϕ2n − 12 |). Then, in a symmetric equilibrium,
upon receiving signal zB, (zA) the leftist (rightist) media sends message mB
(mA) with probability (1 − q) and message mA (mB) with probability q,
where q ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, when the two media outlets receive signal zA, with
probability (1 − q) both of them send message mA, in which case voters
would infer the signal received by the media outlets. At the same time, with
probability q the two media outlets send opposite messages in which case
voters would not get any information from media reports (i.e., their poste-
rior beliefs are equal to their prior). The exact same reasoning applies when
the two media outlets receive signals zB. Therefore, with probability (1− q)
lobbies’ efforts are very productive and with probability q they are com-
pletely unproductive. Hence, in the presence of two media outlets, lobbies
still exert less effort the more they expect the media outlets to slant their
reports. Moreover, media outlets still have higher incentives to slant their
reports, the higher lobbies’ efforts are. Therefore, the main intuitions of the
benchmark model carry out in the two media outlet case.
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Notice that, in the limiting case where there is a large number of media
outlets, there is a probability close to one that at least two media outlets
having biases going in opposite directions report the same message. In this
case, voters would know the signal received by the media outlets and the
equilibrium would converge to a maximally informative one. Similarly, if a
higher degree of competition decreases the media outlets’ incentives to slant
their reports (see, for example, Gabszewicz et al., 2002; Besley and Prat,
2006; Germano and Meier, 2010), the equilibrium would also converge to a
maximally informative one.
Unbiased Media Outlet (Direct Communication between
Lobbies and Voters)
The case where the media outlet is unbiased with probability one is equiva-
lent to a situation where there is no such filter as media and voters receive
a direct signal on the state of the world. Thus, the case where lobbies com-
municate directly with voters is nested in the benchmark model. An obvious
example where such a situation arises is when lobbies compete by engaging
in informative advertising (e.g., issue advertisement). In this case, the signal
that voters receive can be interpreted as which informative content of the
advertisements is stronger.
Proposition 1 shows that, in any informative equilibrium, when the media
outlet is unbiased it never slants its reports. Therefore, the equilibrium with
an unbiased media outlet is equivalent to a maximally informative one.
Hence, even when the media outlet has no bias, the information that voters
receive is still slanted and there is a distortion in the policy outcome, due
to the presence of lobbies’ influence activities.40
Single Lobby
I discuss here the case where there is just one lobby engaging in influence
activities. This situation provides a useful approximation of the limit case
of two asymmetric lobbies. Without loss of generality, suppose the unique
lobby to be the leftist one (lobby a). In such case, a rightist media outlet is
more willing to slant its reports than a leftist media outlet (in a probabilistic
sense), despite having the same ex-ante bias. The asymmetry in the behavior
of the leftist and rightist media outlet types has a clear rationale. When a
leftist media outlet receives signal zB, given that lobby a engaged in influence
40 See Proposition 3.
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activities to decrease the likelihood of such signal, it will consider this signal
very informative. Therefore, in this case, a leftist media outlet would have,
ceteris paribus, low incentives to disregard signal zB and adopt a pooling
strategy. On the other hand, when a rightist media outlet receives signal zA,
given the presence of lobby a’s influence activities, it will not consider this
signal very informative. Therefore, in this case, a rightist media outlet would
have high incentives to disregard such a signal and choose a pooling strategy.
Hence, despite having the same ex-ante bias, a media outlet on the opposite
side of the lobby may appear relatively more biased than the one on same
side of the lobby, since it is more likely to slant its reports. This result has an
immediate implication for empirical studies aimed at measuring media bias.
In the presence of asymmetries between lobbies, a reliable measure of the
bias of a media outlet should take into account the equilibrium difference
between the ex-post slant in a media outlet’s reports and the ex-ante bias
of the media outlet itself.
Conclusions
Lobbies spend hundreds of millions of dollars every year to advocate their
positions. This is especially true on issues where the cost of choosing a policy
different from that of the median voter would be too high for any politician
(ideological/single issue 527 groups). In such cases the lobbies’ main channel
of influence is through voters. Given that voters decide on their preferred
policy based on their idiosyncratic preferences and their beliefs regarding
the expected benefits and costs of alternative policy outcomes, lobbies may
succeed in altering the implemented policy as long as they manage to alter
such beliefs. In this context, the role of a media outlet is to collect informa-
tion on the costs and benefits of the alternative policy outcomes and then
filter this information according to its own political agenda. In this paper,
I have constructed a simple model to capture the interactions among these
political players and analyze their effect on policy outcomes.
The results show that even if the policy outcome implemented (e.g., keep-
ing the status quo or approving a policy proposal) is always the one preferred
by the majority of voters, this policy may not be the one that the median
voter would have chosen if lobbies had not engaged in influence activities.
Moreover, there are two intrinsically related sources of slant in the infor-
mation that voters receive. Lobbies’ influence activities introduce a source
driven slant in the information that the media outlet collects (lobbies-induced
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slant). At the same time there is a supply driven slant resulting from the
idiosyncratic bias of the media outlet (media-induced slant). When the media
outlet has a small idiosyncratic bias, there is a unique equilibrium charac-
terized by a large level of lobbies’ influence activities (high lobbies-induced
slant) and no news-slanting by the media outlet (no media-induced slant).
When the media outlet’s idiosyncratic bias is large, the unique equilibrium
involves a low lobbies-induced slant and a high media–induced slant (in a
probabilistic sense). As a consequence, differences in the level of lobbies’
activities and in the bias of the media outlet translate into differences in
voters’ beliefs and thus may lead to different policy outcomes.
This analysis was intended to shed light on some of the relationships
between lobbies, the media and voters. Future research should probably
consider a more active role of the media. Nevertheless, the message of the
paper remains. Recent lobbying reform laws in the US have focused on
tackling the distortions deriving from the interactions between lobbyists
and politicians, while imposing no restrictions on lobbying activities
targeting voters. Specifically, the 2002 McCain-Feingold campaign finance
law prohibited parties from accepting soft money but it left the activities
of 527 groups unregulated. The present paper suggests that, by doing so,
such reforms may have overlooked a potentially large source of news-slant
and, ultimately, of policy inefficiency.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Lobby a and b’s optimality conditions depend
upon which strategy they expect the media outlet to be playing in the cheap-
talk game with voters. That is, in order to prove the uniqueness of the
informative equilibrium with respect to any given set of parameters values, it
is necessary to characterize the possible informative equilibria of the cheap-
talk game (see Lemma 1 below). Then, I analyze how lobbies’ efforts vary
in these different types of informative equilibria and how the media outlet’s
incentives to slant its news reports change as a function of lobbies’ efforts.
The following lemma provides a characterization of the possible types of
symmetric informative equilibria that can arise in this cheap-talk subgame.
Lemma 1 ∃ϕPIl , ϕMIl ∈ [0, 1] such that :
(i) For all ϕl < ϕPIl , there exists a partially informative equilibrium
where the leftist media outlet type pools on mA, the rightist media
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outlet type pools on mB and the unbiased media outlet type adopts a
separating strategy.
(ii) For all ϕl > ϕMIl , there exists a maximally informative equilibrium
where the leftist and the rightist media outlet types adopt the same
separating strategy of the unbiased media outlet type.
(iii) If ϕMIl > ϕ
PI
l , for all ϕ
PI
l < ϕl < ϕ
MI
l there exists a semi-
separating equilibrium where the leftist media outlet type sends mes-
sage mA upon receiving signal zA and sends mA with probability q and
mB with probability (1−q) upon receiving signal zB, the rightist media
outlet type sends message mB upon receiving signal zB and sends mB
with probability q and mA with probability (1−q) upon receiving signal
zA and the unbiased media outlet type adopts a separating strategy.
Proof: It is immediate to verify that an unbiased media outlet would never
slant its reports in any informative equilibrium. That is, σ∗(ϕu|zA) = mA
and σ∗(ϕu|zB) = mB. Clearly, φ∗u(zA) < 1/2 and φ∗u(zB) > 1/2, hence
P ∗u (zA) = 0 and P ∗u (zB) = 1. Let the posterior beliefs of voters upon hav-
ing received message mA and mB, respectively, be: µ(s = A|mA) = r and
µ(s = A|mB) = t. Assume without loss of generality that r ≥ t (i.e., mA
is the message that the media outlet uses to communicate that it received
signal zA). Than clearly, E[P ∗v (mA)] = 0 and E[P ∗v (mB)] = 1. Thus, the
unbiased media outlet has no incentives to lie. I now focus on the leftist
media outlet.41 Clearly, by applying the same reasoning used for the unbi-
ased media outlet, it must be the case that in any informative equilibrium
σ∗(ϕl|zA) = mA. Hence, it is sufficient to study the case where the leftist
media outlet receives signal zB and derive under which condition it sends mA
rather than mB (i.e., under which condition it adopts a pooling strategy).
Clearly,
φ∗
l
(zB) = ϕl + δ[1 − 2Pr(s = A|zB, eˆ∗a, eˆ∗b)] (20)
thus, σ∗(ϕl|zB) = mA if and only if P ∗l (zB) = 0 that is if and only if:
ϕl <
1
2
− δ[1 − 2Pr(s = A|zB, eˆ∗a, eˆ∗b)] (21)
hence
ϕMIl =
1
2
− δ[1 − 2Pr(s = A|zb, eˆMIa , eˆMIb )] (22)
41 An analogous proof applies to the rightist media outlet.
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ϕPIl =
1
2
− δ[1 − 2Pr(s = A|zb, eˆPIa , eˆPIb )] (23)
ϕSSl =
1
2
− δ[1 − 2Pr(s = A|zb, eˆSSa , eˆSSb )]. (24)

Given Equations (15) and (16), lobby a optimality conditions in a max-
imally informative, partially informative and semi-separating equilibrium
respectively, are42:
V MIa = δ
(
∂hA
∂ea
− ∂hB
∂ea
)
[µMI (s = A|mA, eˆMIa , eˆMIb )
−µMI (s = A|mB, eˆMIa , eˆMIb )] − c = 0 (25)
V PIa = δ(1 − 2y)
(
∂hA
∂ea
− ∂hB
∂ea
)
[µPI (s = A|mA, eˆPIa , eˆPIb )
−µPI (s = A|mB, eˆPIa , eˆPIb )] − c = 0 (26)
V SSa = δ(1 − 2qy)
(
∂hA
∂ea
− ∂hB
∂ea
)
[µSS (s = A|mA, eˆSSa , eˆSSb )
−µSS (s = A|mB, eˆSSa , eˆSSb )] − c = 0 (27)
where µMI (s = A|mA, eˆMIa , eˆMIb ) represents voters’ posterior beliefs in a max-
imally informative equilibrium given that they received message mA and q
is the probability that a biased media outlet slants its reports in a semi-
separating equilibrium.43 Notice that for q → 1, the optimality condition
of the semi-separating equilibrium degenerates into the one of the partially
informative equilibrium. Instead, for q → 0, this optimality condition con-
verges to the one of the maximally informative equilibrium.44 Since in any
symmetric equilibrium ea = eb = e∗, then:
42 A detailed derivation of these ﬁrst order conditions is available upon request to the author.
43 A similar interpretation applies to µPI (s=A|m, eˆPIa , eˆPIb ), µSS (s=A|m, eˆSSa , eˆSSb ), for ∀m ∈
M.
44 Notice that ∀ q ∈ [0, 1] the second order condition is:
γ(1 − 2qy)
(
∂2hA
∂2ea
− ∂
2hB
∂2ea
)
[µSS (s = A|mA, eˆSSa , eˆSSb ) − µSS (s = A|mB , eˆSSa , eˆSSb )]
which is always negative.
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h∗ = hA(e∗, e∗, η) = hB(e∗, e∗, η) =
e∗ + η
2e∗ + η
(28)
where h∗ denote the probability of receiving the correct signal given that
both lobbies exert effort e∗. Moreover, by rational expectations, in any
equilibrium eˆa = eˆb = e∗. Therefore, given that the posterior beliefs of
voters in a symmetric maximally informative equilibrium are such that
µMI (s = A|mA, eˆMIa , eˆMIb ) − µMI (s = A|mB, eˆMIa , eˆMIb ) = 2hMI − 1. Simi-
larly in a semi-separating equilibrium µSS (s = A|mA, eˆSSa , eˆSSb ) − µSS (s =
A|mB, eˆSSa , eˆSSb ) = (1 − 2qy)(2hSS − 1). Thus, given Equations (25)–(28),
lobbies’ effort in the different types of equilibria can be easily computed.
That is:
eMI =
1
2
η
(
2
√
δ
ηc
− 1
)
(29)
ePI =
1
2
η
(
2
√
δ(1 − 2y)2
ηc
− 1
)
(30)
eSS =
1
2
η
(
2
√
δ(1 − 2qy)2
ηc
− 1
)
(31)
Therefore, the last part that needs to be analyzed is how the media outlet’s
incentives to slant its report change as a function of lobbies’ efforts. Since
Pr(s = A|zB, e∗) = e∗2e∗+η is increasing in e∗, then the r.h.s. of Equation (21)
is clearly increasing in e∗. Thus, the higher is the lobbies’ equilibrium effort,
the more likely that a leftist media outlet chooses a pooling strategy. That
is, the media outlet incentives to slant its reports are increasing in e∗. From
Equations (29) and (30) it is immediate to verify that eMI > ePI , then it
follows that ϕMIl > ϕ
PI
l . Moreover, by putting together Equations (28)–(31)
with Equations (22)–(24) it is possible to explicitly derive the equilibrium
no-deviation thresholds:
ϕPIl =
1
2
−
√
cδη
(1 − 2y) (32)
ϕMIl =
1
2
−
√
cδη (33)
ϕSSl =
1
2
−
√
cδη
(1 − 2yq) (34)
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or, equivalently,
q =
1
2y
(
1 −
√
cδη
(12 − ϕl)
)
(35)
for ϕl ∈ [ϕPIl , ϕMIl ]. Hence, the result directly follows from Lemma 1 and
the above results. 
Proof of Corollary 1. It follows immediately from the proof of
Proposition 1. 
Proof of Corollary 2. It follows immediately from the proof of
Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. In order to prove the stated result, it is necessary
to ensure that the comparative statics hold in any type of informative equi-
librium of the game. I first analyze the maximally informative equilibrium.
Given Equation (33), an increase in δ leads to a lower ϕMIl , thus for any ϕl,
the equilibrium would remain an MI one. Thus, since ∂e
MI
∂δ > 0, the result
on δ follows. On the other hand, an increase in c leads to a lower ϕMIl ,
thus for any ϕl, the equilibrium remains an MI one. Thus, since ∂e
MI
∂c < 0
the result follows (clearly, ∂e
MI
∂y = 0 and, by definition of the maximally
informative equilibrium, Pr(σ(ϕn|zA) = σ(ϕn|zB)) = 0). I now analyze the
semi-separating equilibrium. Given Equations (31) and (35):
eSS =
1
2
η
(
δ
1
2 − ϕl
− 1
)
(36)
Thus since ∂q∂δ < 0 and
∂eSS
∂δ > 0, the result on δ follows. On the other
hand, ∂e
SS
∂c = 0 while
∂q
∂c < 0. Thus the net overall effect of an increase
in c in an SS equilibrium is a lower Pr(σ(ϕn|zA) = σ(ϕn|zB)). The same
applies to an increase in y since ∂e
SS
∂y = 0 while
∂q
∂y < 0. Finally, I analyze
the partially-informative equilibrium. Given Equations (32) an increase in δ
leads to a lower ϕPIl . There are two possible cases. Either ϕl is still lower
than the new ϕPIl , in which case the equilibrium is still a PI one and thus
the net effect of an increase in δ would be just an increase in lobbies’ efforts
(since ∂e
PI
∂δ > 0). On the other hand, if ϕl becomes higher than ϕ
PI
l , the
equilibrium switches to an SS one. Nevertheless, from the above reasoning,
in an SS equilibrium ∂e
SS
∂δ > 0 and
∂q
∂δ < 0. Thus in this second case, the net
effect of an increase in δ would be to increase lobbies’ efforts and to decrease
Pr(σ(ϕn|zA) = σ(ϕn|zB)). Similarly, an increase in c leads to a lower ϕPIl .
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There are two possible cases. Either ϕl is still lower than the new ϕPIl , in
which case the equilibrium is still a PI one and thus the net effect of an
increase in c would be just a decrease in lobbies’ efforts (since ∂e
PI
∂c < 0). On
the other hand, if the ϕl becomes higher than ϕPIl , the equilibrium switches
to a SS one. Nevertheless, from the above reasoning, in a SS equilibrium
∂eSS
∂c = 0 and
∂q
∂c < 0. Thus in this second case, the net effect of an increase
in c is to decrease lobbies’ efforts (up to the bound where ePI = eSS ) and
a decrease in Pr(σ(ϕn|zA) = σ(ϕn|zB)). The same reasoning applies to the
comparative statics for y. 
Proof of Proposition 3. When the state of the world is A, the expected policy
outcome in an informative equilibrium of type κ = PI ,SS ,MI is:
E(Pˆ κm|s = A) = µκ(mA|s = A)Pˆ κm(mA) + µκ(mB|s = A)Pˆ κm(mB)
Moreover, PˆNSm (s = A) =
1
2 − δ and PˆNSm (s = B) = 12 + δ. On the other
hand, since in a symmetric equilibrium hA = hB = hSS :
µSS (mA|s = A) − µSS (mA|s = B)
= µSS (mB|s = B) − µSS (mB|s = A) = (1 − 2qy)(2hSS − 1)
moreover:
Pˆ SSm (mA) =
1
2
+ δ[1 − 2(hSS (1 − 2qy) + qy)]
Pˆ SSm (mB) =
1
2
+ δ[1 − 2((1 − hSS )(1 − 2qy) + qy)]
Thus:
ΛMI = ΛPI = ΛSS = δ − cη (37)
In the no-slant policy outcome the expected utility of voter i is UNSi (xi) =
−(12 −xi)2. On the other hand, in a semi-separating type of equilibrium the
expected utility of voter i is:
USSi (xi) = −
(
1
2
− xi
)2
− 4δ2(qy + hSS (1 − 2qy))(1 − [qy + hSS (1 − 2qy)])
Hence, the expected loss from voter i perspective is:
(∆Ui)SS = δ2[1 − (1 − 2qy)2(2hSS − 1)2] = δ · ΛSS
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Hence, given Equation (37), (∆Ui)SS is positively related to δ and negatively
related to c and η. 
Proof of Proposition 4. From the proof of Proposition 3, UMIi (xi) = U
PI
i (xi)
and ΛMI = ΛPI if and only if:
y =
hPI − hMI
2hPI − 1 (38)
Hence, given Equations (28)–(30), the above condition is always verified. 
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